# Mathematics of Public Key Cryptography 

Eric Baxter

April 11, 2014

## Overview

- Brief review of public-key cryptography
- Mathematics behind public-key cryptography algorithms


## What is Public-Key Cryptography?

Cryptographic algorithm that uses public and private keys.

## Public key:

- Public (everyone can see it)
- Used to encrypt plaintext or verify a digital signature

Private key:

- Private (only you can see it)
- Used to decrypt ciphertext or create digital signature

What makes the system useful/secure?

- Easy/quick to generate public/private key pair
- Hard/slow to extract private key from public key


## Why Public-Key Cryptography?

Primary advantage of public-key cryptography:

- Doesn't require secure initial key exchange

Applications of public-key cryptography:

- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [commonly used computer program for encrypting and signing messages]
- GNU Privacy Guard [GPL licensed alternative to PGP]
- Transport Layer Security (TLS) [provides secure sessions when communicating over internet]


## Why not Public-Key Cryptography?

Public-key cryptography also has several associated problems:

- Can be computationally expensive ( $\rightarrow$ use hybrid cryptosystem)
- How can you be sure that owner of public key is who you think it is? ( $\rightarrow$ use something like web of trust)
- Security based on math problems. Could new breakthrough break cryptosystem?


## How Does Public-Key Cryptography Work?

All current public-key algorithms are based on mathematical problems that have no known efficient solution.

There are three problems that are widely used in public-key cryptography:

1. Integer factorization
2. Discrete logarithm
3. Elliptic curves

## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

Idea: it is easy to calculate products of integers, but hard to factor integers.

Toy version:

- For primes $p, q$, the public key is $n=p q$ and the private key is $p$


## Definition

An integer $p$ is prime if $p \geq 2$ and the only divisors of $p$ are 1 and $p$.

Theorem
The Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic says that every integer $n>1$ is either prime or can be uniquely expressed as the product of primes.

## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

Actual implementation: RSA.
Public key is $n=p q$ and exponent, e. Private key is $n$ and $d$ such that $e d \equiv 1(\bmod (p-1)(q-1))$.
Encrypted message is $c(m)=m^{e}(\bmod n)$ and to decrypt we use $m(c)=c^{d}(\bmod n)$.
Definition
Modular arithmetic:
We say $a \equiv b(\bmod c)$ if upon dividing $a$ and $b$ by $c$, the remainders are equivalent. Or, $a \equiv b(\bmod c)$ if $\exists n \in \mathbb{Z}$ s.t.
$(a-b)=n c$.

## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

RSA:
Public key is $n=p q$ and exponent, e. Private key is $n$ and $d$ such that $e d \equiv 1(\bmod (p-1)(q-1))$. Encrypted message is $c(m)=m^{e}(\bmod n)$.

To break RSA, need to take $e^{\text {th }}$ roots modulo composite $n$.

- Easiest known way to do this is to factor $n$
- Has been proven that getting $d$ from $n$ and $e$ (i.e. getting private key from public key) is as hard as factoring $n$ (assuming Extended Riemann Hypothesis).
- However, not known if breaking RSA is as hard as factoring. Maybe there's a way to take $e^{\text {th }}$ root modulo $n$ without factoring?


## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

Is factoring hard?
No known polynomial time algorithm exists to factor integers

Definition
Time complexity:
Quantifies amount of time taken by algorithm as function of length of input.
$O(1)$ means algorithm takes constant time regardless of input lenght.
$O(n)$ means algorithm time scales linearly with input. etc.
Fastest known factoring algorithm is the general number field sieve. Runs in $\sim O\left(e^{1.9(\log N)^{1 / 3}(\log \log N)^{2 / 3}}\right)$.

## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

| Name | Complexity class | Running time ( $T(n)$ ) | Examples of running times | Example algorithms |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| constant time |  | $O$ (1) | 10 | Determining if an integer (represented in binary) is even or odd |
| inverse Ackermann time iterated logarithmic time |  | O(a(n)) <br> $O\left(\log ^{*} n\right)$ |  | Amortized time per operation using a disjoint set Distributed coloring of cycles |
| log-logarithmic |  | $O(\log \log n)$ |  | Amortized time per operation using a bounded priority queue ${ }^{[2]}$ |
| logarithmic time | DLOGTIME | $O(\log n)$ | $\log n, \log \left(n^{2}\right)$ | Binary search |
| polylogarithmic time |  | poly $(\log n)$ | $(\log n)^{2}$ |  |
| fractional power |  | $O\left(n^{c}\right)$ where $0<c<1$ | $n^{1 / 2} \cdot n^{2 / 3}$ | Searching in a kd-tree |
| linear time |  | $O(n)$ | $n$ | Finding the smallest item in an unsorted array |
| "n log star n" time |  | $O\left(n \log ^{*} n\right)$ |  | Seidel's polygon triangulation algorithm. |
| linearithmic time |  | $O(n \log n)$ | $n \log n, \log n l$ | Fastest possible comparison sort |
| quadratic time |  | $O\left(n^{2}\right)$ | $n^{2}$ | Bubble sort; Insertion sort; Direct convolution |
| cubic time |  | $O\left(n^{3}\right)$ | $n^{3}$ | Naive multiplication of two $n \times n$ matrices. Calculating partial correlation. |
| polynomial time | P | $2^{\text {Olog } n)}=\operatorname{poly}(n)$ | $n, n \log n, n^{10}$ | Karmarkar's algorithm for linear programming; AKS primality test |
| quasi-polynomial time | QP | $2^{\text {poly }(\mathrm{log} \text { If }}$ | $n^{\log \log n}, n^{\log n}$ | Best-known O( $\log ^{2} n$ )-approximation algorithm for the directed Steiner tree problem. |
| sub-exponential time (first definition) | SUBEXP | $O\left(2^{-n^{\prime}}\right)$ for all $\varepsilon>0$ | $O\left(2^{\log n^{\log \log n}}\right)$ | Assuming complexity theoretic conjectures, BPP is contained in SUBEXP. ${ }^{[3]}$ |
| sub-exponential time (second definition) |  | $2^{\text {o(n) }}$ | $2^{n^{1 / 3}}$ | Best-known algorithm for integer factorization and graph isomorphism |
| exponential time | E | $2^{O(n)}$ | $1.1^{n}, 10^{n}$ | Solving the traveling salesman problem using dynamic programming |
| factorial time |  | $O$ (nl) | $n!$ | Solving the traveling salesman problem via brute-force search |
| exponential time | EXPTIME | $2^{\text {paly (rf) }}$ | $2^{n}, 2^{n^{2}}$ |  |
| double exponential time | 2-EXPTIME | $2^{2^{\text {poly(n) }}}$ | $2^{2^{n}}$ | Deciding the truth of a given statement in Presburger arithmetic |

## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

Is factoring hard?

RSA challenge

- RSA labs published list of semiprimes (exactly two prime factors) with cash prizes for successful factorization
- Two weeks later, smallest number is factored (100 digits)
- In 2009, researchers factored 232-digit number (RSA-768) using hundreds of machines over a period of 2 years.


## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

| RSA Number | Decimal digits | Binary digits | Cash prize offered | Factored on | Factored by |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RSA-100 | 100 | 330 | US\$1,000[4] | April 1, 1991[5] | Arjen K. Lenstra |
| RSA-110 | 110 | 364 | US\$4,429[4] | April 14, 1992 ${ }^{[5]}$ | Arjen K. Lenstra and M.S. Manasse |
| RSA-120 | 120 | 397 | \$5,898 ${ }^{[4]}$ | July 9, 1993 ${ }^{[6]}$ | T. Denny et al. |
| RSA-129 ["] | 129 | 426 | \$100 USD | April 26, 1994[5] | Arjen K. Lenstra et al. |
| RSA-130 <br> RSA-140 | $\begin{aligned} & 130 \\ & 140 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 430 \\ & 463 \end{aligned}$ | US\$14,527 ${ }^{[4]}$ US\$17,226 | April 10, 1996 <br> February 2, 1999 | Arjen K. Lenstra et al. <br> Herman te Riele et al. |
| RSA-150 [] ? | 150 | 496 |  | April 16, 2004 | Kazumaro Aoki et al. |
| RSA-155 | 155 | 512 | \$9,383 ${ }^{[4]}$ | August 22, 1999 | Herman te Riele et al. |
| RSA-160 | 160 | 530 |  | April 1, 2003 | Jens Franke et al., University of Bonn |
| RSA-170 []] | 170 | 563 |  | December 29, 2009 | D. Bonenberger and M. Krone $\left.{ }^{[0]}\right]$ |
| RSA-576 | 174 | 576 | \$10,000 USD | December 3, 2003 | Jens Franke et al., University of Bonn |
| RSA-180 ['] | 180 | 596 |  | May 8, 2010 | S. A. Danilov and I. A. Popovyan, Moscow State University[7] |
| RSA-190 [] | 190 | 629 |  | November 8, 2010 | A. Timofeev and I. A. Popovyan |
| RSA-640 | 193 | 640 | \$20,000 USD | November 2, 2005 | Jens Franke et al., University of Bonn |
| RSA-200 [] ? | 200 | 663 |  | May 9, 2005 | Jens Franke et al., University of Bonn |
| RSA-210 []] | 210 | 696 |  | September 26, $2013{ }^{[8]}$ | Ryan Propper |
| RSA-704 ['] | 212 | 704 | \$30,000 USD | July 2, 2012 | Shi Bai, Emmanuel Thomé and Paul Zimmermann |
| RSA-220 | 220 | 729 |  |  |  |
| RSA-230 | 230 | 762 |  |  |  |
| RSA-232 | 232 | 768 |  |  |  |
| RSA-768 []] | 232 | 768 | \$50,000 USD | December 12, 2009 | Thorsten Kleinjung et al. |
| RSA-240 | 240 | 795 |  |  |  |
| RSA-250 | 250 | 829 |  |  |  |
| RSA-260 | 260 | 862 |  |  |  |

## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

Is factoring hard?
Shor's algorithm:
Quantum computer algorithm for factoring integers which runs in $O\left((\log N)^{3}\right)$.

Shor's algorithm has been demonstrated using early quantum computers!

Largest number factored using Shor's algorithm:

## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

Is factoring hard?

Shor's algorithm:
Quantum computer algorithm for factoring integers which runs in $O\left((\log N)^{3}\right)$.

Shor's algorithm has been demonstrated using early quantum computers!

Largest number factored using Shor's algorithm: 21

## P-K Cryptography Based on Integer Factorization

How are primes used in RSA found?

Factoring is hardest when $n$ is semi-prime. We want $n=p q$ where $p$ and $q$ are prime and:

- $p$ and $q$ should be of similar bit length but should not be very close
- $p$ and $q$ should be very large
- $p$ and $q$ should be chosen at random

Can find suitable $p$ and $q$ quickly using probabilistic primality tests. These algorithms run quickly and can determine whether a number is prime with high probability.

## P-K Cryptography Based on Discrete Log Problem

Similar in many ways to integer factorization:

- No known polynomial time algorithms on non-quantum computers
- There are efficient algorithms on quantum computers
- Many algorithms can be adapted to both problems

The problem statement:
Find $k$ such that $b^{k}=a$ for $a, b \in G$ where $G$ is a group.

STUFF ABOUT GROUP THEORY

## P-K Cryptography Based on Discrete Log Problem

How can we calculate discrete logs?

Simple algorithm is to raise group element, $b$, to higher and higher powers until we we find solution to $b^{k}=a$. The running time of this algorithm scales linearly with the group size, and thus exponentially in the number of digits in the size of the group.

## P-K Cryptography Based on Discrete Log Problem

Which groups do we use?

## P-K Cryptography Based on Elliptic Curves

Gives comparable security to RSA with significantly smaller key sizes and is less computationally demanding.

Very approximately:
An elliptic curve is a curve of the form $y^{2}=x^{3} a x+b$. Except here we're not interested in real $a, b, x, y$.
We define a multiplication operation for points on the curve. With the above operation, points on the elliptic curve form a group.
Problem is related to computing discrete log on the elliptic curve group.

## P-K Cryptography Based on Elliptic Curves

Applications:

- Tor
- Bitcoin
- iMessage

THE END

